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1 Introduction
Surprisingly, price setting, which is a fundamental strategy for
firms, has not been extensively studied in the existing literature
on declining industries.1 The purpose of this study is to investi-
gate what theory predicts about price dynamics with declining
demand. To this end, this paper constructs a dynamic model
where a monopoly firm produces an old technology product and
its demand declines as a new product appears and spreads among
consumers.
In the model, consumers are assumed to be myopic as to
which product they buy. That means that, every period, con-
sumers compare utility from the old product and the new prod-
uct. The utility from the new product is measured by consumer’s
heterogenous preference to the product and its net surplus, which
is a stochastic variable and increases in expectation. Since we
assume that consumers never buy the old product once they buy
the new one, the number of consumers who buy the new product
increases as time passes if the price of the old product is constant.
By taking this declining number of consumers into consideration,
∗This paper is based on Chapter 3 on my dissertation submitted to Johns
Hopkins University. I thank Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. and Matthew Shum
for their valuable advice and encouragement. I also appreciate the comments
from Fumio Dei, Minako Fujio, Timothy J. Richards, Makoto Yano, and par-
ticipants at the 8th Biennial Pacific Rim Conference and the 85th Annual
Conference organized by Western Economic Association International and
Chiba Keizai University. This study is supported by the Grant-in-Aid for
Young Scientists (KAKENHI #21730199).
1An exception is Ota (2011) that investigates pricing in a duopoly model.
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The price dynamics with a declining demand is nontrivial.
In the model, the demand function becomes more price inelastic as
the number of consumers decreases.2 This makes us imagine two
counteracting motives for pricing. On the one hand, the monopoly
ﬁrm wants to set higher prices because it now faces more inelastic
demand under which higher price induces higher proﬁt. On the
other hand, the ﬁrm also has an incentive to keep ﬁlm prices low,
in order to delay the adoption of digital camera. A contribution
of this paper is to show systematic properties of these nontrivial
price paths and provides new forces deriving the dynamics.
Another contribution is that by studying price competition,
we can focus on an interaction between ﬁrms and consumers. This
interaction is a new aspect in the study of declining industries.
Until now, declining demand is taken exogenously and unaﬀected
by ﬁrm behavior. However, when ﬁrms set price, they can, at least
to some extent, control declining demand. For example, consider
the situation where consumers choose either an incumbent prod-
uct or a new product that brings higher utility. If the price of
the incumbent product is suﬃciently less than the new product,
consumers would choose the former, even though the latter deliv-
ers more service. This shows the possibility that the incumbent
ﬁrm could reduce the decline in demand by preventing consumers
from adopting the new product.
Existing Literature: Many studies on a declining indus-
try do not analyze price paths of its product. In the industrial
organization literature, main theme of a declining industry is the
optimal timing of exit.3 Since the main focus is optimal timing
2Ota (2009) empirically shows the demand for photographic ﬁlm becomes
inelastic after the introduction of digital camera.
3The seminal papers are Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ (1985, 1990) and
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).
the monopoly ﬁrm sets its optimal price so as to maximize the
sum of expected discounted proﬁts.
By solving the monopoly ﬁrm’s dynamic problem numer-
ically, this paper presents simulated price paths and their sys-
tematic properties. The price path follows a sharp drop, an ad-
justment process (price can increase and decrease), and a drop
to a steady-state level in this order. This transition is closely re-
lated with a transition of the number of consumers who remain
in the old product market. We also ﬁnd that the following factors
inﬂuence price dynamics: rate of technological advance of new
product, distribution of consumers’ preference to new product,
and their preference to old product. In particular, distribution of
consumers’ preference to new product alternates the path: uni-
form distribution leads monotonically declining price path, while
(truncated) normal distribution can derives non-monotonic price
paths.
The basic source of price dynamics is due to two counter-
acting motives: raise price to earn more current proﬁt or lower
price to keep consumers for future proﬁt. An important feature
of declining industry is that the number of consumers who remain
in the old product market, which partially determine the proﬁts,
is aﬀected not only by the price but also the net surplus of new
product. Therefore, when the ﬁrm sets the optimal price, it has to
expect how large the number of remaining consumers would be.
For example, if many consumers are in the old product market
but the rate of reduction is high, the ﬁrm would lower to price to
stop the large reduction. Conversely, if only a few consumers stay
in the market but the rate is low, the ﬁrm would raise the price.
These interactions between the ﬁrm’s motives and the number of
consumers generate the price path.
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2 Model
2.1 Set up and timing
The model is cast in discrete time and has an inﬁnite time horizon
so as to avoid a terminal eﬀect. There are N consumers and two
products in this economy. One of them is an existing product and
the other is a new product. Since these products are assumed to
be substututes, consumers choose either of them in each period.
Let Nt be the number of photo ﬁlm consumers at time t. This
implies that the number of consumers who owns the new product
is N −Nt.
The focus of this paper is a declining industry. To this end,
we construct a model where the demand for an existing product
declines by the emergence of a new product. The model captures
the new product by its net surplus denoted by yt, and it is an
stochastically exogenous variable.5 As yt increases, the new prod-
uct becomes more attractive to consumers leading a decline in the
demand for the existing product.
We assume that the net surplus follows a Markov process
yt = f(yt−1, ϵt) where ϵ is an exogenous disturbance, which is
i.i.d. over time and independent of preceding states and choice
variables. Since we consider an inﬁnite time horizon model, the
net value of digital camera yt is bounded by [y, y¯] not to explore.
Then, the evolution of yt is given by the following equation:
yt = max{y,min{f(yt−1, ϵt), y¯}}
In the model, we use the following speciﬁcation for the process:
f(yt−1, ϵt) = ρyt−1 + ϵt (1)
5This paper treats the net surplus just as an exogenous variable. However,
it would be defined as yt = xt − pdt where xt is the value of a digital camera
and pdt is the price of it.
exit, the literature does not explicitly ﬁnd price path. For exam-
ple, Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ (1985, 1990) assume that price goes
down to zero in the long run. This assumption is also found in
another strand of literature. From the international trade aspect,
researchers investigate endogenous protection policy for declining
industries.4 In the models, the declining industry is deﬁned as an
industry where its product’s price goes down.
To my best knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to investi-
gate monopoly ﬁrm’s pricing behavior under a declining demand.
There are two exceptions that mention price changes in a declining
industry. The ﬁrst paper is King (1998). That paper adds a ca-
pacity constraint to the model of Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ (1985),
and analyzes an optimal timing of exit in a two-period setting.
King (1998) demonstrates that ‘survivor’ ﬁrms prepare the fail-
ure of a rival by increasing output before the rival exits, that
pushes down the market price. Since that paper consider a two-
period model, we could not see how the price changes over time as
demand declines. Second, Yano, Dei, and Ota (2012, 2016) inves-
tigate price change in a declining industry under free entry and
exit, and theoretically shows that as demand declines the price
rises. The current paper does not allow free entry and exit be-
cause our aim is to understand the ﬁrm’s pricing behavior when
the exit is not an easy strategy.
In the next section I present the model, and section 3 pro-
vides simulated price paths and their systematic properties. In
section 4, we demonstrates comparative statics and see how the
price paths are aﬀected by exogenous (technological, consumer-
side, ﬁrm-side) variables. Section 5 concludes the analysis.
4For example, see Hillman (1982), Long and Vousden (1991), and Choi
(2001).
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buy the old product again.
Consumers are myopic on their decision regarding whether
to buy the existing product or the new product. That is, given
the price of the existing product pt and the net surplus of the
new product yt, they compare the current static utility of the
new product and that of the existing product, and pick a product
that brings higher utility. Let ϕ(yt, ψ
i) be consumer i’s utility
of having one new product whose net surplus is yt, and u(qt, θ
i)
be a utility function of the existing product. Here, θi and ψi
are consumer i’s preference parameters on the existing product
and the new product , respectively. The associate indirect utility
function is v(pt, θ
i). Myopic consumers buy a new product if
ϕ(yt, ψ
i) ≥ v(pt, θi), and otherwise buy the existing product.
For a further analysis, we specify the utilities from the two
goods. The indirect utility from the new product is
ϕ(yt, ψ
i) = ψiyt (2)
where ψi ∈ [ψ, ψ¯] and 0 ≤ ψ ≤ ψ¯. And the utility function of the
existing product is quadratic such that
u(qit, θ
i) = aiqit −
bi
2
(qit)
2 (3)
where θi ≡ (ai, bi) > 0. We choose this functional form because
the derived individual demand function is liner, which is employed
in an empirical study by Ota (2009):
q(pt, θ
i) = argmax
q
[u(q, θi)− ptq] = 1
bi
(ai − pt)
With this linear demand function, we obtain the associated indi-
rect utility function such as
v(pt, θ
i) =
1
2bi
((ai)2 − p2t ) (4)
where ρ > 0 and ϵ ∼ N(µϵ, σ2ϵ ). The mean of the disturbance is
assumed to be strictly positive (µϵ > 0) so that the net surplus
increases in expectation. When ρ < 1, we can find the stationary
state of y such that y∗ = min{E(ϵ)/(1− ρ), y¯}.
The existing product is assumed to made by a monopoly
firm. The firm sets a price of the product pt in the beginning of
every period, but it doesn’t know the realization of the net surplus
yt at that point of time. Consumers, however, make their decision
whether they buy the existing product or the new product after
both pt and yt are realized.
The optimal policy is obtained by solving backwards. First,
given the price of the existing product pt and the net surplus of the
new product yt, each consumer makes his/her decision. This cre-
ates an aggregate demand for the existing product. The monopoly
firm sets an optimal price so as to maximize the expect current
and future profit based on the aggregated demand function.
2.2 Myopic Consumers
In this section, we develop a demand side model. Ota (2009) finds
that the linear inverse demand function becomes steeper in the
declining photographic film industry. This price inelastic demand
is the source of raising price in the declining industry. Thus, it is
important for this paper to describe the process of the change in
the demand function. To this end, we focus on a specific class of
utility functions and impose on several assumptions on consumer’s
behavior.
Assume that all consumers have the existing product before
the new product is on the market (N0 = N). After the new
product is released, consumers buy only one of them. We also
assume that once a consumer buys the new product, he/she never
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where h(·) is a density function of consumers distribution and
Nt is the number of consumers who prefer the existing product at
time t.6 The homogeneity of consumers preference for the existing
product makes it easier to derive the aggregated demand function,
which is just a summation of the individual demands.
An empirical study by Ota (2009) shows that the demand
for old product becomes more price-inelastic as its demand de-
clines. The above aggregated demand satisﬁes this characteristics.
To see this, derive the inverse demand function
pt = a− b
Nt
Q(ψt, pt) (8)
We can capture a declines in demand by a decline in the number of
consumers Nt. Figure 1 illustrates the inverse demand function.
As the ﬁgure shows, the demand function becomes more price
inelastic as Nt becomes smaller.
2.3 Firm
The monopoly ﬁrm sets its price before the current net surplus
of the new product (yt) realizes. Thus, the ﬁrm doesn’t exactly
know the eﬀect of pt on the current number of consumers Nt. The
ﬁrm can calculate only the expect proﬁt:
Eyt [(pt −MC)Q(ψt, pt)] ≡ Eytpi(ψt, pt)
where ψt = g(yt, ψt−1, pt). The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize
the sum of expected discounted proﬁts:
∞∑
j=t
Eytδ
j−tpi(ψj , pj) (9)
6In the simulation analysis below, we examine two distribution types for
h(ψ): uniform and truncated normal distribution.
To make the analysis simpler, the paper assumes that con-
sumers are heterogenous only in their preference to the new prod-
uct (ψi), but they are homogenous in their preference to the ex-
isting product, i.e., θi = θ ≡ (a, b) for all i. Thus, the individual
demand function of the existing product is identical to every con-
sumers. Then, the indirect utility function (4) also common to
consumers and it becomes v(pt, θ) =
1
2b(a
2 − p2t ). Thus we know
that if consumer i buys a new product then his/her preference ψi
must satisfies the following relation:
ϕ(yt, ψ
i) ≥ v(pt, θ)⇒ ψi ≥ 1
yt
a2 − p2t
2b
(5)
This consumers’ decision creates another state variable ψt
that is a threshold determining who buys the new product (ψi ≥
ψt) or the existing product (ψ
i < ψt) at time t and thus determin-
ing the size of market. Since the relation (5) tells us who buys the
new product, we can define ψt as ψt = min
{
ψi|ψi ≥ 1yt
a2−p2t
2b
}
=
1
yt
a2−p2t
2b . Remember we have assumed that once a consumer buys
a new product, the consumer never buy the existing product in
the future. Then the equation of motion of the state variable can
be rewritten as
ψt ≡ g(yt, ψt−1, pt) = min
{
ψt−1,
1
yt
a2 − p2t
2b
}
(6)
Once we obtain ψt, we can calculate the aggregated demand
function of photo films at time t. Let Q(pt) be the aggregated
demand and it is
Q(ψt, pt) =
∫ ψt
ψ
q(pt, θ)[h(ψ)N ]dψ = q(pt, θ)N
∫ ψt
ψ
h(ψ)dψ ≡ q(pt, θ)Nt
(7)
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where
∂pi
∂p
∣∣∣∣
ψ
= Q(ψ, p) + (p−MC) ∂Q
∂p
∣∣∣∣
ψ
= (p−MC)N 1
b
(a− p− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
The condition makes it clear that the monopoly ﬁrm has two
counteracting pricing motives. On the one hand, the ﬁrm has
an incentive to raise price to earn more current proﬁt. This is
described by ∂pi∂p
∣∣∣
ψ
= (p−MC)N 1b (a−p−1). Although the sign of
this term is undetermined due to the term of (a−p−1), it could be
positive. Then the raise in price increases the current proﬁt. On
the other hand, the ﬁrm also has an incentive to lower price to keep
consumers for future proﬁt. We can see this through two terms
of ∂pi∂ψ
∂ψ
∂p and
∂V
∂ψ
∂ψ
∂p . These terms shows that an increase in price
reduces the number of consumers, and the reduction decreases the
proﬁt.
With the counteracting motives, it is diﬃcult to analytically
answer questions such as how ﬁrms react to declining demand by
means of price setting or how the price dynamics are aﬀected by
consumers’ characteristics. Thus, alternatively, the paper answer
these questions by providing a numerical analysis.
3 Price paths with price-inelastic and declining de-
mand
This section presents several simulated price paths based on the
model. We take two steps to obtain the price paths. First, we
compute the value function (10) by the collocation method. Once
we have the value function, then we simulate prices path alone
with the motion equations (1) and (6). For the simulation, we
need to set an initial value of state variables. They are set at
y0 = 0, ψ0 = ψ¯
where 0 < δ < 1 is the ﬁrm’s discount factor.
Maximization of (9) is accomplished by choice of the op-
timal sequence of price {pt} for t = 1, 2, · · · . The ﬁrm’s value
function is deﬁned recursively:
V (yt−1, ψt−1) = max
pt
{Eytπ(ψt, pt) + δEytV (yt, ψt)}
= max
pt
Eϵt [π(g(ψt−1, f(yt−1, ϵt), pt), pt)
+δV (f(yt−1, ϵt), g(ψt−1, f(yt−1, ϵt), pt))]
By the principal of optimality, the solution to the value function,
evaluated at (yt−1, ψt−1), gives the value of the payoﬀ from the
solution to (9) when the initial state is (yt−1, ψt−1). As the above
value function shows, the current price aﬀects the current proﬁt
and also the future proﬁt through ψt.
7 This is the source of dy-
namic interaction.
Since this is an inﬁnite time horizon model, we seek a time-
independent value for V (y, ψ). On the stationary state, the value
function is rewritten as
V (y, ψ) = max
p
Eϵ[π(g(ψ, f(y, ϵ), p), p)
+δV (f(y, ϵ), g(ψ, f(y, ϵ), p))] (10)
We can prove the exitance of the value function (10) because it
satisﬁes the monotonicity condition and δ ∈ (0, 1) for applying
Blackwell’s theorem.
The ﬁrst order condition for the problem (10) is as follows:
∂V
∂p
= Eϵ
[
∂π
∂p
+ δ
∂V
∂p
]
= Eϵ

 ∂π∂ψ����
+
∂ψ
∂p����
−
+
∂π
∂p
����
ψ� �� �
?
+ δ ∂V∂ψ����
+
∂ψ
∂p����
−
 = 0
7The value function does not explicitly include the number of consumers
because it is a function of ψt as in (7).
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We investigate the simulated price paths when consumers’
characteristics is represented by ψi, which is uniformly distributed
and normally distributed on a bounded support separately. The
benchmark distributions are, respectively,
ψ ∼ U [0, 20] and ψ ∼ N+(10, 42) on [0, 20]
where N+ denotes a truncated normal distribution. In order
to keep the diﬀerence between uniform distribution and normal
distribution clear, we set the same means and domains. The
means of both distribution are set at µψ = 10. We set the
standard deviation of the normal distribution as σψ = 4, which
means that about 95% population of consumers are distributed
in [µψ − 2σψ, µψ +2σψ] = [2, 18]. This allows us to ﬁt the normal
distribution onto the support [0, 20] with less distortion. Another
benchmark parameter conﬁguration is
(a, b) = (20, 1), y ∈ [0, 100], ρ = 1, ϵt ∼ N(1, 0.52),
N = 100, δ = 0.9,MC = 0 (11)
The discount factor is set at relatively low value of 0.9 because
convergence is very slow for high values of δ. The distribution
of ϵt, the disturbance of the net surplus, is set at N(µϵ, σ
2
ϵ ) =
N(1, 0.52). The ﬂuctuation σ2ϵ is smaller than µϵ, which results in
a relatively steady increase in yt. Since price paths are expected
to move with yt, this stable evolution of yt makes it possible to
highlight the ﬁrm’s counteracting motives in pricing.
3.1 Simulation results: The case of uniform distribution
In this subsection, we characterize the simulated price paths when
the consumers’ characteristics are uniformly distributed. We mainly
Figure 1: An aggregated inverse demand function becomes more
price-inelastic as demand declines.
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The reason of ψ0 = ψ¯ is that, as equation (5) shows, the consumer
who has the highest ψ starts buying the new product. We impose
two more assumptions in the simulation. First, the price at time 0
is the static monopoly price (p0 = p
m).8 The second assumption
is a remedy for a subtle problem. When the number of photo
film consumer becomes zero (Nt = 0), the firm can set any level
of price that generates meaninglessly fluctuated price paths. To
avoid this, we impose an assumption such that if Nt−1 < 1 then
pt = pt−1.9
8Static monopoly price is given by
pm = argmax
pt
Eyt
[
(pt −MC)Nt 1
b
(a− pt)
]
=
a+MC
2
Here price and the market size Nt are assumed to be independent, the static
monopoly price does not change even though demand declines.
9Notice that we don’t impose this restriction when we calculate the value
function.
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We investigate the simulated price paths when consumers’
characteristics is represented by ψi, which is uniformly distributed
and normally distributed on a bounded support separately. The
benchmark distributions are, respectively,
ψ ∼ U [0, 20] and ψ ∼ N+(10, 42) on [0, 20]
where N+ denotes a truncated normal distribution. In order
to keep the diﬀerence between uniform distribution and normal
distribution clear, we set the same means and domains. The
means of both distribution are set at µψ = 10. We set the
standard deviation of the normal distribution as σψ = 4, which
means that about 95% population of consumers are distributed
in [µψ − 2σψ, µψ +2σψ] = [2, 18]. This allows us to ﬁt the normal
distribution onto the support [0, 20] with less distortion. Another
benchmark parameter conﬁguration is
(a, b) = (20, 1), y ∈ [0, 100], ρ = 1, ϵt ∼ N(1, 0.52),
N = 100, δ = 0.9,MC = 0 (11)
The discount factor is set at relatively low value of 0.9 because
convergence is very slow for high values of δ. The distribution
of ϵt, the disturbance of the net surplus, is set at N(µϵ, σ
2
ϵ ) =
N(1, 0.52). The ﬂuctuation σ2ϵ is smaller than µϵ, which results in
a relatively steady increase in yt. Since price paths are expected
to move with yt, this stable evolution of yt makes it possible to
highlight the ﬁrm’s counteracting motives in pricing.
3.1 Simulation results: The case of uniform distribution
In this subsection, we characterize the simulated price paths when
the consumers’ characteristics are uniformly distributed. We mainly
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nobody buys the new product, the price of existed product can
be at the monopoly price.
However, once the net surplus yt reaches to a certain level,
price sharply drops. In this benchmark case, price decreases by
about 22.8% just in four periods (period 5 to 9). By comparing
with the (d)evolution of ψt where high ψt means many consumers
prefers the old product, we notice that price falls before ψt starts
falling. This shows that by setting low price, the firm tries to
keep more consumers.11 We can see that this is a reaction of the
monopoly firm that sets a dramatically low price in a short period
in order to keep the old product attractive to many consumers.
We call these periods Stage I and the price movement of
this stage is summarized as below:
Stage I: Price stays at the monopoly price for a few initial times,
and then the price sharply drops from the monopoly price.
After the sharp drop, the price stays around a certain level
and then decreases gradually until it drops again. First, we ex-
plain that price stays around a certain level after the huge price
drop. This happens because the monopoly firm’s two counter-
acting motives are equilibrated: raise price to earn more profits
now or lower price to keep consumers for the future profit. On
the one hand, the firm has a motive to continue lowering price as
the net surplus of the new product yt has been increasing, which
makes more consumers switch to the new product. On the other
hand, as yt increases, the number of consumers who buy the ex-
isting product decreases and this causes price-inelastic demand
11An exception is when yt evolves quickly µϵ = 6 where both start falling
simultaneously. This would happen because since the rate of technological
advance of new product is so high that consumers start switching even if the
firm sets a lower price of the old product. But this does not deny the firm’s
precautionary pricing.
Figure 2: Benchmark case
focus on the benchmark case shown in Figure 2 where price path,
evolution of ψt and yt are located at the upper-left, the upper-
right, and the lower-left corner, respectively.10
We first observe that the price stays at the monopoly price
(from period 1 to 4), and then the price sharply drops from the
monopoly price. Until the new product is introduced at time 0,
we assume that the monopoly firm has set the monopoly price,
which is p0 = 10. The net surplus of the new product evolves with
random shocks from time 0 and it increases in expectation, but it
is quite low in the initial few periods. This implies that consumers
obtain higher utility from consuming the existed product. Since
10To check the robustness of the observation here, Ota (2010) provides those
paths under diﬀerent parameters such as µϵ = 2, µϵ = 6, δ = 0.99, ψ ∼ [2, 18],
and ψ ∼ [0, 30].
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nobody buys the new product, the price of existed product can
be at the monopoly price.
However, once the net surplus yt reaches to a certain level,
price sharply drops. In this benchmark case, price decreases by
about 22.8% just in four periods (period 5 to 9). By comparing
with the (d)evolution of ψt where high ψt means many consumers
prefers the old product, we notice that price falls before ψt starts
falling. This shows that by setting low price, the firm tries to
keep more consumers.11 We can see that this is a reaction of the
monopoly firm that sets a dramatically low price in a short period
in order to keep the old product attractive to many consumers.
We call these periods Stage I and the price movement of
this stage is summarized as below:
Stage I: Price stays at the monopoly price for a few initial times,
and then the price sharply drops from the monopoly price.
After the sharp drop, the price stays around a certain level
and then decreases gradually until it drops again. First, we ex-
plain that price stays around a certain level after the huge price
drop. This happens because the monopoly firm’s two counter-
acting motives are equilibrated: raise price to earn more profits
now or lower price to keep consumers for the future profit. On
the one hand, the firm has a motive to continue lowering price as
the net surplus of the new product yt has been increasing, which
makes more consumers switch to the new product. On the other
hand, as yt increases, the number of consumers who buy the ex-
isting product decreases and this causes price-inelastic demand
11An exception is when yt evolves quickly µϵ = 6 where both start falling
simultaneously. This would happen because since the rate of technological
advance of new product is so high that consumers start switching even if the
firm sets a lower price of the old product. But this does not deny the firm’s
precautionary pricing.
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As a ﬁnal reaction of the ﬁrm, the price drops sharply to the
steady state level. The ﬁrm starts lowering price several periods
before yt hits its upper bound. This shows that the motive of
lowering price overwhelms the motive of raising price. This is
a diﬀerence from Stage II where the counteracting motives are
almost equilibrated. A key observation to clear this diﬀerence is
the steady state. Once yt reaches its upper bound, there are no
dynamics in price and no change in the number of consumers who
buy the old product. The ﬁrm will need to operate its business
with the remaining consumers. Thus in the long run, lowering
price to retain more consumers would be a better strategy than
rasing price.
We call these periods Stage III. In the benchmark case, the
price drops by 10% (7.4 to 6.6, which is a steady-state level price)
in 24 periods from period 80 to period 103. The price movement
of this stage is summarized as below:
Stage III: The price drops sharply to the steady state level. The
steady state is attained when the net surplus yt reaches its
upper bound.
3.2 Simulation results: The case of truncated normal
distribution
How does the simulated price path depend on the distribution
type of consumers’ characteristics? In this subsection, we investi-
gate the price paths when ψ is normally distributed on a bounded
support. Diﬀerent from uniform distribution, normal distribution
is unimodal. We set the case of Figure 3 where ψ ∼ N+(10, 42) on
[0, 20] with (11) as a benchmark of normal distribution cases.12
12See Ota (2010) for the robustness of the observations in this case. That
paper provides alternatives cases such as µϵ = 2, µϵ = 6 , δ = 0.99, ψ ∼
(see equation (8)). This provides an attractive environment for
the monopoly firms to execute its market power to raise price.
However, as the value of net surplus becomes bigger, the
price decreases gradually until it drops again. This shows that
the motive of lowing price is getting stronger than the motive
of raising price. We would explain this as follows. Since many
consumers has already switched to the new product by this time,
there is a small portion of consumers who still prefer the old prod-
uct. In addition, the net surplus of the new product has been in-
creasing, but its upper bound (y¯) is getting closer. Then it would
be more profitable in total to lower the price to keep consumers
rather than raising the price that leads to less consumers because
the number of consumers does not change after yt reaches the up-
per bound. In this way, as yt increases, the motive of lowing price
is getting stronger and this leads to the gradual decrease in price.
We call these periods Stage II. In the benchmark case, it
lasts about 70 periods (from period 10 to 80), which occupies
about 70% of whole time periods where price is adjusted. We see
that in a large portion of time, price is gradually adjusted with the
evolution of the net surplus of new product. The price movement
of this stage is summarized as below:
Stage II : The price stays around a certain level and then de-
creases gradually. This stage lasts longer than Stage I.
In this simulation analysis, we set an upper bound on the
net surplus of the new product, yt < y¯. Once the net surplus
reaches the upper bound, the value of new product does not im-
prove. Since there is no stochastic process after yt reaches y¯, price
dynamics also vanishes. We call periods after yt = y¯ a steady
state.
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As a ﬁnal reaction of the ﬁrm, the price drops sharply to the
steady state level. The ﬁrm starts lowering price several periods
before yt hits its upper bound. This shows that the motive of
lowering price overwhelms the motive of raising price. This is
a diﬀerence from Stage II where the counteracting motives are
almost equilibrated. A key observation to clear this diﬀerence is
the steady state. Once yt reaches its upper bound, there are no
dynamics in price and no change in the number of consumers who
buy the old product. The ﬁrm will need to operate its business
with the remaining consumers. Thus in the long run, lowering
price to retain more consumers would be a better strategy than
rasing price.
We call these periods Stage III. In the benchmark case, the
price drops by 10% (7.4 to 6.6, which is a steady-state level price)
in 24 periods from period 80 to period 103. The price movement
of this stage is summarized as below:
Stage III: The price drops sharply to the steady state level. The
steady state is attained when the net surplus yt reaches its
upper bound.
3.2 Simulation results: The case of truncated normal
distribution
How does the simulated price path depend on the distribution
type of consumers’ characteristics? In this subsection, we investi-
gate the price paths when ψ is normally distributed on a bounded
support. Diﬀerent from uniform distribution, normal distribution
is unimodal. We set the case of Figure 3 where ψ ∼ N+(10, 42) on
[0, 20] with (11) as a benchmark of normal distribution cases.12
12See Ota (2010) for the robustness of the observations in this case. That
paper provides alternatives cases such as µϵ = 2, µϵ = 6 , δ = 0.99, ψ ∼
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the normal distribution cases while they are equilibrated in the
uniform distribution cases. This diﬀerence comes from the shape
of the normal distribution. The transition of ψt shows that only a
few consumers prefer the old product after the initial price drop,
and these consumers are on the left tail (lower ψ) of the distri-
bution. Since it is a truncated normal distribution, the density
on the left tail decreases as the ψ is lower. Thus, even if the ﬁrm
raises the price that induces a lower ψt, this induces a few remain-
ing consumers to switch to the new product. This strengthens the
motives for raising the price.
We can summarize the common observation including both
types of distribution of consumers’ characteristics as follows:
Result: The price path follows a sharp drop, an adjustment
process (price can increase and decrease depending on the
distribution of consumer’s type), and a drop to a steady-
state level in this order. This transition is closely related
with a transition of the number of remaining consumers.
4 Comparative statics
This section examines comparative statics of the price paths gen-
erated under each distribution of ψ. We investigate the following
questions:
1. What happens when the rate of technological advance in-
creases? (yt+1 = ρyt + ϵt)
(a) Change the mean of ϵt ∼ N(µϵ, σ2ϵ )
(b) Change ρ: Spill-over eﬀect and depreciation of previous
net surplus.
Figure 3: ψ ∼ N(10, 42) on [0, 20] and ϵ ∼ N(1, 0.52)
The simulated price paths under the normal distribution
of consumers’ characteristics are similar to those under uniform
distribution except Stage II. We can observe that price increases
after the initial sharp drop while the price slightly decreases after
a stable path in the uniform distribution cases.
Stage II: When consumers’ characteristics ψ is normally dis-
tributed, the price path can be in up rate after the initial
price drop.
Remember that the monopoly firm sets its price from two
counteracting motives: raise price to earn more profits now or
lower price to keep consumers for future profit. Simulation re-
sults show that the former motive is stronger than the latter in
N(10, 32), and ψ ∼ N(10, 52).
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the normal distribution cases while they are equilibrated in the
uniform distribution cases. This diﬀerence comes from the shape
of the normal distribution. The transition of ψt shows that only a
few consumers prefer the old product after the initial price drop,
and these consumers are on the left tail (lower ψ) of the distri-
bution. Since it is a truncated normal distribution, the density
on the left tail decreases as the ψ is lower. Thus, even if the ﬁrm
raises the price that induces a lower ψt, this induces a few remain-
ing consumers to switch to the new product. This strengthens the
motives for raising the price.
We can summarize the common observation including both
types of distribution of consumers’ characteristics as follows:
Result: The price path follows a sharp drop, an adjustment
process (price can increase and decrease depending on the
distribution of consumer’s type), and a drop to a steady-
state level in this order. This transition is closely related
with a transition of the number of remaining consumers.
4 Comparative statics
This section examines comparative statics of the price paths gen-
erated under each distribution of ψ. We investigate the following
questions:
1. What happens when the rate of technological advance in-
creases? (yt+1 = ρyt + ϵt)
(a) Change the mean of ϵt ∼ N(µϵ, σ2ϵ )
(b) Change ρ: Spill-over eﬀect and depreciation of previous
net surplus.
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Table 1: Summary of comparative statics
Parameter Eﬀects on price path
Tech. advance
µε, ρ
As µε or ρ increase,
(i) Each stage becomes shorter;
(ii) Shape of price path does not change.
Consumer’s side
a,
[
ψ,ψ
]
, µψ
As a increases,
(i) Initial price drop becomes larger.
When µψ increases or
[
ψ,ψ
]
gets narrower,
it holds that (i) and
(ii) Price declines (increases) more sharply
after the initial drop when ψ is
uniformly (normally) distributed.
Firm’s side
δ
As δ increases (the ﬁrm becomes more
patient), the ﬁrm sets lower price in stage III.
level in Stage I. These observations reveal that the ﬁrm corre-
sponds to the rate of technological advance more quickly as the
rate is higher, but it does not change the optimal policy on each
pair of states, yt and ψt.
Alternatively, we see an increase in the rate of technological
advance by setting ρ more than 1. Diﬀerent from changing the
mean of ϵt, ρ aﬀects the current net surplus through the previous
period’s net surplus. Thus we can interpret that when ρ > 1, the
technological advance has a spill-over eﬀect on the net surplus.
We set ρ = 1, 1.01, 1.02 and compare the price paths.
Figure 5 shows the price paths of this comparative statics.
2. What happens depending on the preferences for the old
product?
3. What happens depending on the distribution on consumer
types?
(a) Change the range of domain of distribution: Narrower
distribution means more homogeneous consumers.
(b) Change the mean of the distribution: Larger mean
means consumers appreciate new product more.
4. What happens as the discount factor increases so a firm is
more patient?
The results of comparative statics are summarized in Table 1.
Figures 4 - 9 show the comparative statics of price paths.
In each figure, I put the results of the uniform distribution case
in the left column and those for the normal distribution case in
the right column.
Rate of technological advance of new product: The net
surplus of the new product can be thought as the value of the
product, and it is a stochastic process: yt = ρyt−1+ϵt. The distur-
bance ϵ ∼ N(µϵ, σ2ϵ ) captures exogenous technological advances,
and in particular µϵ represents the average rate of technological
advance. Here by changing µϵ, we see what happens to the price
paths when the average rate of technological advance increases.
Figure 4 shows paths of price, ψt and Nt under µϵ = 1, 2, 4 for
each distribution of ψi: uniform distribution and truncated nor-
mal distribution.
There are two observations in this comparative statics. First,
as the rate of technological advance increases, time periods of each
phase get shorter. Second, for all cases, price drops to the same
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Table 1: Summary of comparative statics
Parameter Eﬀects on price path
Tech. advance
µε, ρ
As µε or ρ increase,
(i) Each stage becomes shorter;
(ii) Shape of price path does not change.
Consumer’s side
a,
[
ψ, ψ
]
, µψ
As a increases,
(i) Initial price drop becomes larger.
When µψ increases or
[
ψ, ψ
]
gets narrower,
it holds that (i) and
(ii) Price declines (increases) more sharply
after the initial drop when ψ is
uniformly (normally) distributed.
Firm’s side
δ
As δ increases (the ﬁrm becomes more
patient), the ﬁrm sets lower price in stage III.
level in Stage I. These observations reveal that the ﬁrm corre-
sponds to the rate of technological advance more quickly as the
rate is higher, but it does not change the optimal policy on each
pair of states, yt and ψt.
Alternatively, we see an increase in the rate of technological
advance by setting ρ more than 1. Diﬀerent from changing the
mean of ϵt, ρ aﬀects the current net surplus through the previous
period’s net surplus. Thus we can interpret that when ρ > 1, the
technological advance has a spill-over eﬀect on the net surplus.
We set ρ = 1, 1.01, 1.02 and compare the price paths.
Figure 5 shows the price paths of this comparative statics.
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Figure 5: Comparative statics: Rate of technical advance of new
product: ρ
parameter a captures a positive preference to the old product.
Here we investigate what happens to price paths when consumers
prefer the old product more. Figure 6 compares the price paths
under a ∈ {20, 30, 35}.
We observe three findings. First, we see that it takes a
longer time until the initial price drop as a increases. This finding
is common to the distribution type of consumers’ characteristics.
For example, when ψ is uniformly distributed, price starts falling
at period 6 under the case of a = 20. It is period 16 and 21 when
a = 30, 35, respectively. This is intuitive because consumers prefer
the old product more as a increases, and begin to switch to the
new product with higher yt.
The second finding is on the price path of the uniform dis-
Figure 4: Comparative statics: Rate of technical advance of new
product: µ
Observations are the same as ones in the previous case: (i) as the
rate of technological advance increases, time periods of each stage
get shorter, and (ii) for all cases, price drops to the almost same
level in Stage I. The firm responds to the rate of technological
advance more quickly as ρ is higher, but it does not change the
optimal policy on each pair of states, yt and ψt. From these com-
parative statics, we find that the rate of technological advances
does not change the optimal policy. Thus, the factors that may
change the optimal policy would be something that are related
with consumers’ or the firm’s characteristics. In below, we inves-
tigate comparative statics of such factors.
Preference to the old product: Consumer’s utility function
for old product is represented by u(qt) = aqt − b2(qt)2. Thus the
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Figure 5: Comparative statics: Rate of technical advance of new
product: ρ
parameter a captures a positive preference to the old product.
Here we investigate what happens to price paths when consumers
prefer the old product more. Figure 6 compares the price paths
under a ∈ {20, 30, 35}.
We observe three findings. First, we see that it takes a
longer time until the initial price drop as a increases. This finding
is common to the distribution type of consumers’ characteristics.
For example, when ψ is uniformly distributed, price starts falling
at period 6 under the case of a = 20. It is period 16 and 21 when
a = 30, 35, respectively. This is intuitive because consumers prefer
the old product more as a increases, and begin to switch to the
new product with higher yt.
The second finding is on the price path of the uniform dis-
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prefer the old product. For example, at period 50, there are more
than half of all consumers when a = 35 while there are less one
quarter when a = 20. Since consumers are normally distributed,
the density is the highest at the mean. This implies that a price
increase would make a lot of consumers switch to new product.
Thus, we guess that the ﬁrm’s motive for raising price in Stage II
becomes weaker as a increases.
Distribution of consumers’ type: Next, we investigate how
the price paths change depending on distributions on consumer
characteristics. First, we compare price paths by narrowing the
support of the distributions but keeping its mean. A narrow sup-
port of the distribution means that consumers are more homoge-
nous. (Consumers are perfectly homogenous in their preference
for photo ﬁlms.) Second, we compare price paths by changing the
means of distributions but keeping their supports. Larger mean
means that consumers appreciate the new product more.
Figure 7 compares simulated price paths when narrowing
the support of the distributions but keeping its mean the same.
First, focus on the uniform distribution cases where ψ ∼ U [0, 20],
U [2, 18], U [5, 15]. We ﬁnd two features in the price paths. As
consumers are more homogenous, (i) the initial price drop is big-
ger and (ii) after the initial price drop, the price paths decline
more sharply. These phenomena are explained by the diﬀerence
in probability density functions. As the supports becomes nar-
rower in uniform distribution, their density becomes larger at each
point of ψ in the support. This implies that a marginal decrease
of ψ loses more consumers. Through (6), price aﬀects the state
variable ψt representing the cut oﬀ point for who buys the new
product. Thus, a higher price induces more consumers to switch
to the new product as the support is narrower. This weakens the
Figure 6: Comparative statics: Preference to the old product
tribution cases. It seems that price drops more in Stage I as a
increases. In the uniform distribution cases, price falls by 2.28
(from 10 to 7.72) when a = 20, and it is 3.18 and 3.85 when
a = 30, 35, respectively. However, when we take the drop rate
measured by the value of price fell divided by the initial price, it
is about 22% for all cases above.
The third finding is seen in the normal distribution cases.
It seems that as a increases, it is less obvious to find the price
increase in Stage II. We explained that since consumers who prefer
the old product are on the left tail of normal distribution by that
stage, the price increase does not induce the remaining consumers
to switch to the new product. This strengthens the motives of
raising the price rather than those of lowering price for the future
profit. However, when a increases, there are more consumers who
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prefer the old product. For example, at period 50, there are more
than half of all consumers when a = 35 while there are less one
quarter when a = 20. Since consumers are normally distributed,
the density is the highest at the mean. This implies that a price
increase would make a lot of consumers switch to new product.
Thus, we guess that the ﬁrm’s motive for raising price in Stage II
becomes weaker as a increases.
Distribution of consumers’ type: Next, we investigate how
the price paths change depending on distributions on consumer
characteristics. First, we compare price paths by narrowing the
support of the distributions but keeping its mean. A narrow sup-
port of the distribution means that consumers are more homoge-
nous. (Consumers are perfectly homogenous in their preference
for photo ﬁlms.) Second, we compare price paths by changing the
means of distributions but keeping their supports. Larger mean
means that consumers appreciate the new product more.
Figure 7 compares simulated price paths when narrowing
the support of the distributions but keeping its mean the same.
First, focus on the uniform distribution cases where ψ ∼ U [0, 20],
U [2, 18], U [5, 15]. We ﬁnd two features in the price paths. As
consumers are more homogenous, (i) the initial price drop is big-
ger and (ii) after the initial price drop, the price paths decline
more sharply. These phenomena are explained by the diﬀerence
in probability density functions. As the supports becomes nar-
rower in uniform distribution, their density becomes larger at each
point of ψ in the support. This implies that a marginal decrease
of ψ loses more consumers. Through (6), price aﬀects the state
variable ψt representing the cut oﬀ point for who buys the new
product. Thus, a higher price induces more consumers to switch
to the new product as the support is narrower. This weakens the
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Figure 8: Comparative statics: Change the mean of distributions
tics are normally distributed, and this is due to a stronger motive
for rasing price. However, as the support of the distribution be-
comes narrower, the two counteracting motives are equilibrated
by the weakening motive for raising price.
Here we compare price paths by changing the means of dis-
tributions but keeping their supports. In this comparative static,
we see how the price paths change if consumers prefer the new
product more. For the uniform distribution cases, we investigate
price paths under ψ ∼ U [5, 15], U [3, 13], [0, 10] where each mean is
10, 8 and 5, respectively but the range of the support is common
to 10. For the truncated normal distribution cases, we investigate
the cases where ψ ∼ N(12, 42), N(10, 42), N(5, 42) supported by
ψ ∈ [0, 20].
To do this, we change the mean of each distribution from
Figure 7: Comparative statics: Narrowing support of distribu-
tions
firm’s motive to raise price, and strengthens the motive to lower
price to keep consumers. Thus, as consumers are more homoge-
nous represented by a narrower support, the firm tends to lower
price.
For the normal distribution case, it is less obvious to find
the price increase in Stage II as the support of the distribution
becomes narrower. This can be also explained by the same logic
above. As the support becomes narrower, the associated prob-
ability density function takes a larger value at each point of ψ
in the support. Since this implies that a marginal decrease of ψ
loses more consumers and a higher price lowers ψt through (6),
the firm weakens its motive to raise the price. In the benchmark
case, the price increases in Stage II when consumers’ characteris-
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Figure 8: Comparative statics: Change the mean of distributions
tics are normally distributed, and this is due to a stronger motive
for rasing price. However, as the support of the distribution be-
comes narrower, the two counteracting motives are equilibrated
by the weakening motive for raising price.
Here we compare price paths by changing the means of dis-
tributions but keeping their supports. In this comparative static,
we see how the price paths change if consumers prefer the new
product more. For the uniform distribution cases, we investigate
price paths under ψ ∼ U [5, 15], U [3, 13], [0, 10] where each mean is
10, 8 and 5, respectively but the range of the support is common
to 10. For the truncated normal distribution cases, we investigate
the cases where ψ ∼ N(12, 42), N(10, 42), N(5, 42) supported by
ψ ∈ [0, 20].
To do this, we change the mean of each distribution from
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Figure 9: Comparative statics: Discount factor of the ﬁrm
price declines. When the distribution has a smaller mean, there
remains more consumers who prefer the old product. With more
consumers, the motive for raising price overwhelms the motive for
lowering price.
Discount factor of the firm: Finally, we consider whether
the ﬁrm’s characteristics aﬀect the price path. By changing its
discount factor, we see what happens to the price path as the
ﬁrm becomes more patient. Figure 9 shows the price paths with
δ = 0.9, 0.95, 0.99. We obtain two ﬁndings common to both dis-
tribution types: (i) the discount factor has little eﬀects on the
initial price path, but (ii) steady-state price is in lower level as
the ﬁrm is more patient.
When the ﬁrm is more patient, it appreciates the future
proﬁts more. Thus, we can expect that the ﬁrm sets lower price
their benchmark case. Figure 8 shows simulated price paths and
associated paths of ψt. We ﬁnd: as the mean of consumer’s char-
acteristics becomes larger, i.e., more consumers prefer the new
product, (i) the initial price drop is bigger and (ii) after the ini-
tial price drop, the price paths decline (increase) more sharply
when ψi is uniformly (normally) distributed.
First, consider the uniform distribution cases. Since their
support range, which is 10, is the same, their probability density
function is the same, too. Thus, one unit of decrease in ψ loses
the same number of consumers. In the last comparative statics
of narrowing the support, this eﬀect of a decrease of ψ on Nt
is important to explain the price decline. However, even with
the same magnitude of the eﬀect, price decreases more sharply as
consumers on the whole prefer the new product.
By looking at the middle ﬁgures of Figure 8, we notice that
the transition path of ψt, which is a state variable representing
the cutoﬀ point who buys the new product, does not vary by the
distributions. This implies that at each time period, there are less
consumers who prefer the old product for the distribution having a
larger mean. Then we can guess that the number of consumers at
each point of time is another important factor to set price. With
less consumers the motive for lowering price is stronger than the
motive for rasing price for the future proﬁts, while the latter is
stronger than the former with more consumers.
Similarly, in the normal distribution cases, the transitions
of the state variable ψt do not vary by the distribution. Thus, at
each time period, there are fewer consumers who prefer the old
product for the distribution having a larger mean. In the bench-
mark case of the normal distribution, we saw the price increase in
Stage II. However, in the normal distribution with small mean, the
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to keep as many consumers as possible. This explains the second
ﬁnding: the more patient the ﬁrm is, the lower the ﬁrm sets price
at the steady state level. However, as the ﬁrst ﬁnding shows that
the ﬁrm’s discount factor aﬀects the price path in the later periods
when the upper bound of the net surplus is closing. In the early
periods after the introduction of new product, the price is set
according to the evolution of yt but not the discount factor δ.
5 Conclusion
This paper constructs a dynamic model where a monopoly ﬁrm
produces an old technology product and its demand declines as a
new product appears and spreads among consumers. The paper
presents simulated price paths and their systematic properties.
Through comparative statics, this paper demonstrates that
distribution type of consumer’s characteristics is a critical factor
in alternating price paths. Under an assumption that myopic
consumers never buy an old product once they buy the new one,
the number of current consumers and the rate of reduction are
important points for price setting. The distribution of consumer’s
characteristics aﬀects these points.
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